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Satire and Dissent: A Theoretical Overview 
 
 
Day, A. (2012). Satire and Dissent: A theoretical overview.  Comunicazione Politica, 12 (1) 
 
Abstract: 
In an age when Jon Stewart tops lists of most-trusted newscasters and Michael Moore 
becomes a focus of political campaign analysis, the satiric register has attained renewed and 
urgent prominence in political discourse.  Day focuses on three central contemporary forms: the 
parodic news show, the satiric documentary, and ironic activism.  She highlights their shared 
objective of circumventing the standard conduits of political information and the highly stage-
managed nature of current political discourse.  In so doing, she argues, they provide fans with a 
sense of community and purpose notably lacking from organized politics in the twenty-first 
century. 
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While voter apathy may be as high as ever, interest in traditional news on the wane, and 
professional political dialogue merely a repetition of partisan talking-points, there is nevertheless 
a renaissance taking place in the realm of political satire.  A number of new satiric forms have 
exploded in popularity in recent years, all markedly political, and all incorporating the real into 
the mimetic in striking ways.  Turn on the television in any number of countries around the 
world and you are bound to find at least one news-parody show providing its take on 
contemporary events.  A trip to the multiplex offers a slew of fiercely political documentaries 
that embody a striking blend of polemic and satire.  Meanwhile, activist groups are looking to 
capture your attention by staging elaborately ironic stunts.  The political discourse taking place 
in the satiric register currently appears far more vibrant than any of the traditional outlets for 
serious political dialogue.  Whether or not satire has become verifiably more “popular,” satiric 
media texts have become a part of mainstream political coverage, thereby making satirists 
legitimate players in serious political dialogue.   
In my book, Satire and Dissent: Interventions in Contemporary Political Debate, I focus on 
three of the most prevalent new forms: the parodic news show, the satiric documentary, and 
ironic activism.  These emergent genres are notable for their lack of fictionalized material and 
impersonations, relying instead on deconstructions of real news events, improvisational pranks, 
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and ambushes of public figures.  All share a performative form of irony that injects the satirists’ 
bodies into the political world, as they physically interrogate and interact with the real, 
cultivating a blurring of the traditional categories of entertainment and news, art and activism, 
satire and political dialogue.  Notably, these forms have generated strong affective communities 
around them, capturing the interest of many in a way that organized politics has often struggled 
to do, as viewers look to the parodists to voice their opinions within the public arena.  The fact 
that this mode has become so popular makes discovering why particularly important.  
While I describe the documentaries as “satiric,” the news programs as “parodic,” and the 
activist stunts as “ironic,” I believe that all three significantly overlap.  I have brought them 
together because I see them as collectively composing the larger phenomenon I am describing.  I 
analyze the satiric/ironic/parodic register as a particular discursive strategy within the larger 
media playing field.  My intention is to provide a broad overview of the historical moment, 
connecting the dots to examine a larger shift in both entertainment and political dialogue.   
The pull toward the ironic, the book contends, is related to the manufactured quality of 
contemporary life.  The public discourse available to us is overwhelmingly designed as 
spectacle, but rarely acknowledges itself as such.  Political actors and corporate spokespeople are 
carefully staged, groomed, and scripted, and their armies of handlers are experts at getting their 
talking points on television.  Seemingly everyone is aware that the “candid” moment of 
exchange between politician and citizen at a folksy roundtable has been assiduously pre-framed, 
but the news media rarely point this out.  In this highly stage-managed landscape earnestness can 
seem suspect.  It is the quality that over-produced public figures bend over backwards to convey, 
while there is something about the unabashedly personal, ironic, tongue-in-cheek perspective 
that appears refreshingly authentic.  This has likely contributed to the attraction toward 
personalities like those of Jon Stewart, Rick Mercer, Stephen Colbert, Michael Moore, Morgan 
Spurlock, and others who have all, as entertainers, slid into the role of political pundits, while 
activists craft spectacularly ironic stunts, similarly sliding into the role of entertainers.  As the 
book explores, the satiric barb is an increasingly popular means of gaining control of the 
conversational ball within political discourse.   
Much of the growth in satiric offerings in the United States in particular coincided with 
George W. Bush’s tenure as president.  That is not a coincidence.  His administration expanded 
presidential power while limiting transparency and access.  As a result, his staff became skilled 
at using political doublespeak to obscure.  At the same time, the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 made the mainstream press reticent to appear adversarial, meaning that official 
language and policies went unchallenged, particularly in the lead-up to the Iraq war.  The 
uninterrogated discourse was then rife for deconstruction by ironists who moved in to fill the 
critical void.  However, while the Bush administration provided particularly fertile ground for 
satire, satirists will certainly not have a lack of material any time soon.  Regardless of the 
personalities in power, we still have a system in which realities tend to be infinitely more 
complicated than the made-for-TV performances of those realities; in which public-relations-ese 
is the second language of pundits and politicians; and in which public political discussion is a 
difficult realm for anyone but industry insiders to break into.  As long as these circumstances 
endure, so too will the desire to poke holes in the spectacle and challenge the truth value of 
statements made by elites.   
The book breaks the primary case studies into three groupings.  By “parodic news show,” I 
refer to television programs framed as if they were a straight news program, but understood as a 
send-up of the format.  I concentrate primarily on The Daily Show and The Colbert Report in the 
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United States and This Hour Has 22 Minutes and The Rick Mercer Report in Canada.  Most of 
these shows have multiple rotating cast members, but there are a few particularly famous hosts 
who I examine as celebrity figureheads: Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert, and Rick Mercer.  I refer 
to the second genre as “satiric documentary.”  The films in this category are politically motivated 
documentary exposes created in a tongue-in-cheek tone.  Most are structured around a first-
person narrator/protagonist who places himself in front of the camera as the everyman stand-in.  
I focus primarily on the filmmakers Michael Moore and Morgan Spurlock.  Finally, I refer to 
“ironic activist groups” to describe a popular contemporary mode of political agitation.  These 
groups attempt to capture media attention through spectacular stunts and ironic public 
happenings.  The technique I focus on most heavily is one I call “identity nabbing,” in which 
members of the groups publicly pose as people they are not.  I focus primarily on the Billionaires 
for Bush, the Yes Men, and Reverend Billy.   
All of these case studies are markedly different from the wholly textual examples of satire 
normally examined within literary theory.  Rather than being confined to the page or to the realm 
of fiction, they incorporate the real into the satiric in a tangible way.  This ability to manipulate 
the real gives the satire a great deal of power.  Rather than just doing a critical impersonation of a 
public figure, for instance, Michael Moore ambushes real officials, cornering them into playing 
themselves within his frame and providing the damning evidence for the thesis he has already set 
up. Similarly, when Jon Stewart juxtaposes footage of a politician’s statements on several 
different occasions to demonstrate his/her duplicity, the piece becomes evidence in a real 
political argument on a level that a fictionalized skit does not.  In a sense, these hybrid satiric 
genres become performative: they create that which they name/enact in the moment.   
The unique workings of these hybrid genres point up gaps in both the theory of satire and 
public sphere theory.  The most common assumptions about satire are that it is detached from the 
problems it critiques and from any real desire for change, meaning that it is rarely treated as 
substantive political speech (or is dismissed as the worst kind of negative, cynical politics).  In a 
similar way, theorists of the public sphere tend to focus on “rational” political debate, ignoring 
discursive engagement in other registers.  It seems integral, however, to examine these texts as 
instances of political discourse, and to take seriously their contributions to public dialogue.  
These genres are linked by several important characteristics, including a desire to challenge 
the standard formulas within the mainstream press, a choice to do so by highlighting absurdities 
and inconsistencies, and a reliance on impromptu personal interactions.  They offer a method of 
influencing the political discussion by poking holes in the pre-framed narratives and public 
relations screens, and by providing to legions of fans, relief, satisfaction, a sense of purpose, and 
connection with others.  Ultimately, I contend, the satiric realm is one of the most vibrant arenas 
of public debate in operation today. 
 
Ironic Authenticity 
There is something synergistic about the relationship between new technologies and these 
emergent forms of satire.  The way in which contemporary irony has developed is tied to the 
creation of digital technologies.  While new media have certainly contributed to the scripted 
nature of public discourse, these technologies are equally being mobilized to critique that 
discourse.  The Internet has played a central role in the rapid dissemination of much satire, while 
technologies enabling easy access to video footage and tools for repurposing it have had an 
enormous influence on contemporary satirists.  In short, the technology has made it relatively 
simple to create ironic commentary on media discourse as it unfolds.  And, though many worry 
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that the presence of irony signals a lack of sincerity, there has been a flowering of irony wielded 
for earnest political aims.   
The success of the satirists examined here is at least partially due to their achievement as 
viral phenomena, with clips from, say, The Daily Show forwarded widely among friends.  
Communication over the internet has also been key to sustaining communities around these 
forms.  Beyond the more large-scale examples, though, there are also millions of individuals 
making their own online videos, many of which draw on irony, parody, and satire as the 
audience hook.  The tactics of communication popular in these videos are also common to the 
professional satirists: editing to create ironic juxtapositions, creating popular culture “mashups” 
to generate unexpected moments of resonance, and the shaming of public figures through 
collections of contradictory statements.  Henry Jenkins and Stephen Duncombe point to practices 
such as these as fueling a large-scale shift in communication, arguing, “this is how we tell our 
stories now – we quote from the media and the culture around us;” (Jenkins and Duncombe) and 
we often draw on irony to do so.  But the widespread use of irony is also generating its own 
cultural anxiety.  Worries about it ubiquity and speculations about its effects constantly swirl 
around irony, particularly when mixed with the political.  Literary theorists have been arguing 
about its effects for centuries, but irony’s perceived prevalence as a cultural dominant since the 
1990s has made it a prominent contemporary preoccupation in both academic and journalistic 
criticism.     
In the 1990s, irony was the catchall term for describing the sensibilities of postmodernism, 
but its prevalence also created a backlash, with many warning of its dangers, culminating, at the 
end of the decade, with Jedediah Purdy’s book For Common Things.  Purdy describes 
contemporary citizens as painfully self-aware and terrified of appearing naïve.  We revel in the 
ironic quip, he explains, because we find it difficult to speak earnestly about personal matters, 
and almost impossible about public issues.  He argues that we have lost the belief that politics 
can bring about a better world.  Instead, “contemporary irony finds in public life a proliferation 
of cant that reinforces ironic skepticism” (15).  He was both lionized and ridiculed for this 
prognostication, with most commentators focusing on his treatment of irony.  Purdy later 
expressed frustration with this, explaining that he was using the concept only to get at the larger 
phenomenon of indifference (Hirschorn).  This is the major weakness of his account, as his 
description of irony is incredibly imprecise.  Nevertheless, his usage is a symptomatic one.  The 
commonly held belief is that where there is irony, parody, or poking fun, there must too be a 
smirking cynicism and, by extension, political disengagement.  This is an accusation that dogs 
irony in all of its forms.  However, there are clearly a growing number of artists and activists 
looking to irony as a prime tool with which to advocate for change.  In other words, the opposing 
camp sees irony as a potential antidote to cynicism and disengagement.  The two opposing 
viewpoints regard irony wildly differently, one as a mode of smug detachment signaling a lack of 
will, the other as a potentially powerful form of critique and engagement.   
This dispute replayed itself with a vengeance following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.  As commentators struggled to express what people were feeling, one of the 
pronouncements that echoed through magazines was that, if nothing else, irony would now be 
put in its place.  As Roger Rosenblatt of Time magazine put it, up until that moment, nothing was 
taken seriously: “with a giggle and a smirk, our chattering classes – our columnists and pop 
culture makers – declared that detachment and personal whimsy were the necessary tools for an 
oh-so-cool life” (79).  All of that, he declared, would now come to an end as people who had 
come face to face with evil would finally throw off “the tyranny of the ironists” (79).  Looking 
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back at the aftermath of 9/11, Jamie Warner points out that the Bush administration was a step 
ahead of Rosenblatt’s call to seriousness, invoking the dichotomy of Good versus Evil to make 
sense of the world (Warner).  This framework served as a national unifier, but also restricted 
dissent, as it created an either/or construction that demonized not just the terrorists but anyone 
who questioned that binary.  Warner points out that though journalists repeated the 
administration’s terms, the satiric newspaper The Onion did not, instead using irony to introduce 
ambiguity, prompting readers to question the dualism so dominant everywhere else.  I would add 
that The Onion is not the only example.  Rather, the lack of substantive critique in the 
mainstream press created a vacuum that was soon filled by a variety of ironic commentary. 
Though they certainly did not have the same frame-setting power as the mainstream media, 
voices such as those of The Daily Show, Michael Moore, viral video makers, and numerous 
activist groups attempted to undermine the power of the dominant narrative, drawing numerous 
fans eager to hear this critique made.   
While I do not believe that irony is somehow inherently progressive, there happens to have 
been an enormous upsurge in its usage as a means of dialoguing with the political sphere.  While 
some irony may certainly take the form of the distanced savvyness Purdy finds so off-putting, 
that does not mean we should elide all forms of irony with these modes.  Perhaps because it is 
such a common lingua franca, there has been a movement to use irony’s components: the self-
referentiality, the wit, and the bite, as political tools in the hope for change.  Clearly, irony is not 
inseparably linked to cynicism; rather, it appears that, for many, it is becoming a new marker of 
sincerity.   
 
Truthiness and Consequences in Parodic News 
In recent years, there has been an explosion of fake news and talk-show outlets in media 
markets around the world.  The form is not new, as faux news reports have been incorporated 
into variety shows in the past.  However, these segments were featured as a single recurring 
sketch amongst many.  Now, as entire programs have developed around the conceit, a more 
fleshed-out genre has emerged.  These newer programs involve far fewer impersonations, 
sketches about politicians’ personal foibles, or entirely made-up news items.  Instead, they 
incorporate deconstructions of real news events, as well as interviews or ambushes of actual 
public figures, blending the mimetic and the real.  In other words, they tread a finer line between 
news and entertainment.  This hybridity has served to thrust the programs into serious political 
debate, while well-known hosts of the format are seen as pundits in their own right.  Due to these 
blurring boundaries, there is some uneasiness around the genre, with many accusing it of 
fomenting cynicism and detachment from the political world.  I argue quite the opposite: this 
blend of satire and political non-fiction enables and articulates a critique of the inadequacies of 
contemporary political discourse, while demonstrating an engaged commitment to the possibility 
of a more honest public debate.   
Though these programs are usually referred to as “fake news,” that label obscures their more 
complicated relationship to “real” news and the attraction they hold for fans frustrated with the 
compromised authenticity of straight news programming.  Less fictionalized imitations, the 
programs act as comedically critical filters through which to process the suspect real world of 
reportage and debate.  The importation of non-fiction material into the mimetic frame often 
serves to call attention to how the “real” is itself constructed.  One of the primary targets on these 
shows is the lack of substance behind much political discourse – the public-relations spin tactics 
used by politicians and corporations and the lack of interrogation on the part of the news media.  
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It is through this pointing up the artificiality of public discussion that, for many fans, these 
“fake” news shows actually come closer to embodying the characteristics – like authenticity and 
truth – that we would normally associate with the “real.”   
In the book, I trace the history of this form, beginning with some groundbreaking programs 
in the early 1960s which were ultimately too controversial to survive, through the subsequently 
safer home of variety programming, into the explosion of new shows in the present.  I focus my 
textual analysis primarily on The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, This Hour Has 22 Minutes, 
and The Rick Mercer Report since they are some of the most popular and/or long-running shows, 
and because they provide the best examples of the melding of satire with serious political 
discourse.   
This genre relies on an interweaving of the mimetic and the real.  Clearly, audience members 
are not to mistake the hosts for real newscasters, nor to view the shows as legitimate news 
broadcasts.  When Jon Stewart segues to a report from a correspondent “on location,” who is 
actually on the set in front of a green screen, the studio audience inevitably erupts in giggles.  
The comedy derives from the audience’s awareness of mimesis and appreciation for the skills of 
the performers.  Within this parodic universe, however, the writers draw in pieces of the real.  
Most obviously, they rely on real news stories, with the host deconstructing the official rhetoric 
and media sound-bites.  While the straight news world is supposed to simply report, these shows 
are free to satirically compare and contrast, interrogate and mock, sometimes developing a 
deeper analysis than the straight programs.  Many of the performers additionally provide 
editorials on current events.  Rick Mercer, for example, is well known for his political rants, 
filmed while he is walking down the street.  Though they are certainly amusing, these 
monologues are premised on the audience having a fairly sophisticated knowledge of Canadian 
party politics.   
In addition, these programs interact with the real political world via interviews with public 
figures.  Some incorporate ambush interviews, while all include lengthy consensual interviews.  
More often than not, guests are politicians, academics, or journalists.  The exchanges are 
conducted in a style somewhere between a straight news interview and a celebrity chat, with 
hosts putting their guests at ease by cracking jokes, but segueing into “often-heady conversations 
about public affairs” (Baym, 216).   
The hybridity of the genre allows for the manipulation of footage within the satiric frame 
with the intention of affecting broader discourse.  The theses advanced by these shows often do 
become a part of the public record, for instance, when Stewart plays clips of a public figure on 
several occasions directly contradicting him- or herself.  As opposed to textual parodies that 
allude to real events but exist outside of the political world, in these shows, the comedians 
interact with the real, literally dialoguing with the day’s news or interviewing newsmakers 
themselves.  Viewers tune in to watch the performers comedically interrogate, critique, and 
transform the real.   
Parodic news does what the straight news cannot in staging an ongoing dialogue with itself, 
cross-examining the rhetoric of public figures and of standard news discourse.  In so doing, the 
hosts become audience stand-ins.  If a regular newscaster cannot roll an eye at a politician’s 
statement, the comedian can fall off his chair doing so, acting as the viewer’s surrogate, as we 
take vicarious pleasure in hearing our own opinions aired on television.  In one newspaper article 
on The Daily Show, a journalist interviews members of the studio audience and quotes a 78-
year-old woman, who explains her affection for Stewart: “’he can really see through things and 
some of the shams we’re being fed,’ she says. ‘And I’m tired of the shams.  I want a little truth to 
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come out.  I want somebody to see some of the things I see and Jon does that for me’” 
(Thompson, 1E).   
As our stand-ins, these performers have also garnered a form of status not granted to the 
average comic. Rick Mercer, for example, has become a ubiquitous Canadian celebrity, known 
for his political critiques, and has been tapped for his expertise south of the border, sought out 
not for jokes but for his knowledge of current affairs.  Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert have 
received even more attention, winning awards not simply for performance but expertise in 
journalism and contributions to public discourse.  Each has garnered a reputation as a media 
watchdog and political provocateur, partially because of the material on their programs, but also 
due to infamous public outbursts, like Stewart’s withering critique of the debate program 
Crossfire, delivered on the program itself, and Colbert’s indictment of president George W. Bush 
at the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner in 2006.   
But the programs’ increased legitimacy has sparked some cultural anxiety, attracting 
suspicion about what message audiences are receiving.  Since fans clearly enjoy poking fun at 
the news media and the flawed nature of public discourse, there is concern that they are 
becoming disillusioned with politics as a whole.  The accusation that dogs the genre is that it 
begets cynicism, trivializing the serious and leading viewers to see the political world through 
detached amusement.  Jody Baumgartner and Jonathan Morris have written several articles 
designed to demonstrate that The Daily Show in particular encourages cynicism.  They have had 
subjects watch clips of either The Daily Show or a straight news program and then answer 
questions about how much faith they have in the U.S. electoral system, what they thought of 
particular candidates, or how much they trust the media to cover events fairly.  Finding that 
viewers of The Daily Show are slightly less likely to express faith in particular candidates or the 
news media, they conclude that the show increases viewer cynicism.  However, a lack of blind 
faith in the American electoral system or particular candidates might just as easily be described 
as healthy skepticism, as an understanding of nuance, or as an engaged form of wishing for 
more.  Nowhere in the studies do they link unhappiness with politics or its reportage with a belief 
that they cannot be changed for the better, nor with a lack of desire for change.   
My own analysis reveals that, in opposition to the tendency in much political comedy to 
critique personalities rather than policy (sending the message that everyone is equally inept and 
immoral and there is nothing to be done about it), the parodic news shows are far more likely to 
dissect substantive policies and structures.  Indeed, while late night comedians usually move 
quickly from issue to issue in a series of one-liners, The Daily Show spends several minutes 
covering each story, often providing more background information than straight news programs, 
or describing how the media contribute to the lack of meaningful debate.  As Baym articulates, 
the Daily Show’s critique stems from a belief in a deliberative theory of democracy: “the notion 
that only civil and honest conversation can provide the legitimate foundation for governance” 
(118).  It points out where the 24-hour news media fall short and models the ideal in its own 
interview segments.  Stewart seriously engages with guests from all intellectual corners, most 
often taking the attitude of someone searching for solutions, interested in what his guests think 
the answers are and in how areas of consensus can be reached.  One quality all these popular 
hosts share is less a smug detachment than a passionate enthusiasm for the political world and a 
desire to spread that interest to their audiences.   
It seems that these television shows are anything but cynical, as they actively engage the 
issues of the day, provide context to contemporary dilemmas, dissect how both politicians and 
the press work to cloud political discussion, and encourage the development of solutions.  Given 
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the avid fan activity around the programs and the flurry of gleeful web forwarding that follows a 
particularly trenchant piece, it seems clear that viewers gain energy and pleasure from witnessing 
the deconstruction of contemporary debate, and they clearly use the show as a form of 
connection with others.  These programs are providing a powerful locus for critique, debate, and 
communion.  In fact, their function begins to approach that which many public sphere theorists 
have classically hoped for in straight news, while still standing a parodic step removed.   
 
Heroes and Villains: Satiric Documentarians Spearhead the Debate 
Long an art-house curiosity, the documentary film has muscled its way into mainstream 
debate.  As a reporter for the Chicago Tribune put it in 2004, “documentaries, traditionally a 
speck on the cultural periphery, have moved front-and-center in the national discussion, 
achieving a relevancy and popularity that would have been inconceivable just two years ago” 
(Caro 1).  At the heart of this shift has been the popularity of a new formula.  The satiric 
documentary combines a playful, satiric style with unabashed polemic, resulting in a product 
rooted simultaneously in mass culture entertainment and political activism, guerrilla theater and 
documentary exposé.  These elements are brought together through a narrative centered around 
the filmmaker’s personal quest.  The satiric documentarian plays two important roles: on screen, 
he performs the classic fool, asking revealing questions out of (feigned) naïveté, while, as 
filmmaker, he plays the preacher, providing the framing for how these interactions are 
interpreted.  I argue that these directors’ primary achievement is in successfully nurturing the 
creation of oppositional political communities, or “counterpublics,” anchored by the films and 
sustained by books, websites, and interviews.  As popular culture objects, the films serve as 
accessible touchstones, energizing those who already share similar opinions and functioning to 
shift the wider debate.   
The figure most identified with this format is Michael Moore.  He came to public 
attention with his first film, Roger & Me (1989), a cheeky exposition of the disintegration of 
Flint, Michigan after General Motors closed its local factories, structured around Moore’s quest 
to speak with CEO Roger Smith.  Since then, he has built on this style in five more films.  He has 
also developed two television series and written four books, makes appearances on the talk-show 
circuit, conducts speaking tours, and hosts a large online community.  Although Moore 
pioneered the genre, other directors have followed.  The most prominent is Morgan Spurlock, 
whose films include a satiric jab at fast-food culture, Super Size Me (2004), and Where in the 
World Is Osama bin Laden? (2008), tracking his one-man mission to hunt down bin Laden.   
 Both Moore and Spurlock hail from the political left; both attempt to popularize critiques 
that are relatively marginal; and since their work frequently has undisguised political intent, it is 
both loved and despised.  Satiric documentaries incorporate a mix of genres and styles, 
engendering competing demands on how they should be read.  The use of the word 
“documentary” is one of the things that most angers detractors, as it is a term that, for many, is 
associated with qualities like objectivity and transparency.  In reality, documentary film has 
never fully been able to live up to these ideals, nor has it always been expected to.  Most 
contemporary media consumers likely do understand that all media messages are constructed, 
but, nevertheless, many are unconvinced of their neighbor’s ability to understand this.  Critics of 
Moore’s and Spurlock’s films on the political right complain about the movies being polemical, 
arguing that they are propaganda and thus cannot be documentaries.  The implication is that 
audience members might be duped into believing that, say, Moore is offering an objective picture 
of President Bush’s record in Fahrenheit 9/11 because it is billed as a documentary.  Detractors 
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express intense loathing, seeing them as potentially dangerous due to the combination of 
unabashed polemics, the ability to attract audiences, and the cultural legitimacy that the word 
“documentary” is perceived to confer. 
Ultimately, if we look to the satiric documentary to uphold standards of objectivity it is going 
to fall short.  This is not where the genre excels, nor what it strives for.  Rather, it is opinionated, 
satiric, and intimate, and, as such, has its own strengths and appeal.  The embodied presence of 
the filmmaker is key to the genre’s draw, as he takes the audience vicariously along for the ride 
on his individual quest.  Much like an op-ed, it offers a personal treatise on a particular issue, 
through unlike a written piece, it builds its case on revealing interviews and encounters that can 
resonate on both intellectual and emotional levels. Their strength is in articulating a critique that 
may already be shared by many, but that is not normally heard within the dominant public 
sphere, and doing so in an entertaining manner.  These films become accessible nodes of 
identification, attracting and energizing counterpublic communities, and affecting the direction 
of wider debate.  As Robert Toplin argues about Fahrenheit 9/11, in the lead up to the 2004 
election, “no single work of speechmaking, writing, filmmaking, or television producing sparked 
as much debate about the direction of U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy as Fahrenheit 
9/11 did” (9).  The satiric documentary has had a profound impact on the contemporary political 
discussion.   
In the book I briefly trace the various documentary movements and styles that have 
influenced the satiric documentary, as well as the history of guerrilla theater that informs the 
films’ stunts.  Since the filmmakers are the main actors in their stunts as well as the directors, 
they have the advantage of playing two important roles.   
In an analysis of Roger & Me, Miles Orvell observes that “Moore turns the tables on 
traditional documentary: he himself becomes the ‘powerless’ subject” (17).  That film 
deliberately foregrounded his status as a nobody filmmaker pitted against the army of security 
guards surrounding his powerful subject.  It is a formula he has continued to rely on (though 
some would now call it a contrivance), as the premise of his work is to attempt to make the 
powerful accountable to the public, or to expose them as unaccountable.  To get anywhere on 
this mission requires that the on-camera Moore seemingly have the innocence to believe, for 
instance, that the guards at Guantanamo Bay will allow him and his boatload of sick Americans 
to receive access to the free medical care offered to the prisoners there (in Sicko).  Moore taps 
into the long satirical tradition of playing the fool, using what Mikhail Bakhtin refers to as the 
technique of “not grasping” (402) to dissect the conventions of his society.  The repeated 
moments of him naively trooping into some corporation’s headquarters to chat with a higher-up 
are constructed to expose the failures of the modern public sphere.  Corporate America is 
powerful enough to speak only in PR sound-bites and has no interest in debate with the person 
on the street.  As opposed to more traditional forms of satire that critique real but absent 
officials, Moore brings his script to his targets, forcing them to play themselves within his frame, 
providing the damning confirmation for his thesis.  
In a similar way, Spurlock also plays the fool.  Though he spends less time trying to trick 
individuals into revealing too much via loaded questions, in Super Size Me he uses a “foolish” 
conceit to expose industry sins.  As many less enthusiastic critics have testily pointed out, 
Spurlock must have known that an all McDonald’s diet combined with little exercise would be 
bad for him, but he undertakes it with a naïve attitude of “how bad can it be?”  He can then shock 
audiences with the details of how bad it really can be.  His second film is similarly organized 
around another foolish quest: to personally hunt down Osama bin Laden to make the world safer 
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for his unborn child.  He does deliver some interesting footage of his encounters in other 
countries, but he ends up ultimately being too foolish about a complex topic, as he does not offer 
the viewer any clear message about what should be done in the fight against terrorism.  
Spurlock’s on-screen fool is here not sufficiently balanced by a strong directorial voice.  What is 
missing is the role of the preacher.   
The fool, easily dismissed as crazy, is fairly powerless on his own.  In the majority of their 
work, Moore and Spurlock ensure that, as directors, they also play the preacher, structuring their 
footage to make a forceful claim.  Moore relies heavily on ironic juxtaposition to deconstruct 
seemingly innocuous statements and point to revealing parallels.  His films are structured around 
a pointed voice-over and held together by stock footage, music, and titles, communicating a clear 
thesis (for instance the segment in Capitalism: A Love Story which uses footage from a film 
about Jesus’ life, redubbed with free-market platitudes about self-sufficiency).  Both filmmakers 
use techniques borrowed from fiction film to make their didacticism entertaining, preaching to 
their audience while also keeping them amused.  Both also continue preaching outside of the 
movie theater – in interviews, speaking tours, books, television programs, and online.  They 
routinely remind their audiences that there are alternatives to the problems portrayed in their 
films, often specifically entreating viewers to take action. Both have worked to build a 
politicized counterpublic around their work, thereby prolonging continued circulation of 
discourse around their pet issues. 
 As Michael Warner explains, neither publics nor counterpublics preexist the circulation of 
texts.  This is not to say that those watching a Moore film were previously blank slates suddenly 
radicalized by the experience.  Clearly there were people predating Moore who held similar 
views.  However, his work offers a temporary focal point for those views, allowing people to 
identify through the consumption of particular popular culture texts.  Moore works to draw 
attention to issues that have been relatively ignored by the national media, pushing them into the 
larger political dialogue.  Those already interested in taking up such a debate often invoke his 
movies to do so, as they become part of a shared lexicon.   
Morgan Spurlock is not nearly as polarizing a figure, but with his first film, Super Size Me, 
he did become identified with the issues surrounding the American obesity epidemic, fast food 
culture, and corporate accountability.  Like Moore, he managed to push these issues out from the 
margins into the wider public sphere.  
The press also happily frame these filmmakers as heads of political counterpublics.  
Surrounding Fahrenheit 9/11 in particular, many began treating Moore as the more logical 
opponent to President Bush than even the democratic candidate John Kerry.  This figurehead 
slippage did not always work in favor of Moore’s goals (nor Kerry’s), as Moore became an 
easily targeted straw-man for the other side.  Consequently, from the beginning, media coverage 
focused on the horse-race quality: whether Moore would succeed in persuading undecided 
voters.  Of course, it is impossible to measure how many votes Moore succeeded in attracting or 
repelling, but thinking in these terms at all seems absurd, as it implies that one cultural text could 
be expected to single-handedly cause quantifiable political change.  Nevertheless, this is the 
standard frequently used to judge the political effect of satire.  
The problem with defining political effect so narrowly is that it reduces all democratic 
politics down to what one does at the polls, ignoring the groundwork that precedes any type of 
change, negating the lengthier process of shifting popular assumptions.  While it is unlikely that 
Moore himself expects he will be able to single-handedly transform every CEO he hunts, he 
joins the efforts of other counterpublic agents to “transform notions of the common good and to 
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reprioritize items on public and official agendas” (Asen and Brouwer 25).  Thus, it is more useful 
to examine the impact of these films in terms of their influence on political discourse.  Reviewers 
of Fahrenheit 9/11 noted that in many theaters audiences were bursting into applause at the end.  
Moore had succeeded in articulating a point of view that many shared and were longing to hear 
confirmed.  As Toplin puts it, “it was clear that Moore had done more than preach to the 
converted.  He had energized them and given them hope” (135).  Cheering him on was a way of 
identifying with a larger movement, one that suddenly seemed tangible and that was making 
inroads into the national debate.    
In attracting such large audiences and generating press, these filmmakers become significant 
figures in the battle for hegemony between competing discourses.  Though they offend many, 
they also continue to inspire many others.  They are far from universally respected, and their 
films are not without flaws, but their talent is in continuing to be imperfect, opinionated 
spokespersons for change, who are willing to play all the roles we demand of them in the process 
–from hero to villain.   
 
Irony in Activism 
As mass media communication has evolved, so too have the tactics employed by political 
activists.  More and more groups are now building their actions around a playfully ironic 
sensibility, creating attention-getting stunts and graphics, along with pre-packaged media sound-
bites.  Many activists are now adeptly creating their own cultural texts.  And though the use of 
irony may appear trivial to some, it is in the service of dead-serious aims, used not only to attract 
attention, but to call upon their audiences’ shared assumptions, to make members of existing 
discursive communities present to one another, and, ideally, to turn those communities into 
actively politicized ones.  
 It is easy to dismiss political critique aimed at those who already appreciate the 
perspective as merely “preaching to the converted.”  The common assumption is that activists are 
wasting their time if they are speaking to people who already share their convictions.  However, 
it is important to remember that the so-called converted may still be apathetic, or unconnected to 
a larger movement, or simply in need of some validation.  Passively holding a particular opinion 
is not analogous to acting on it or even to privileging it as particularly pressing.  As Jonathan 
Gray argues, there is a reason that most preachers do preach to the converted every week; they 
clearly believe that reinforcement is important (158-9).  Additionally, I contend, affirmation 
fulfills an integral community building function, crucial to nurturing a political movement.  
While the type of efficacy achieved by ironic activists is often less measurable in terms of 
concrete legislative goals, it is located in the strengthening of the visceral experience of 
community, and in the attempt to shift debate by turning laughter over a shared joke into anger 
and engagement.   
 I focus on a practice I term “identity nabbing,” in which participants pretend to be 
someone they are not, appearing in public as exaggerated caricatures of their opponents.  
Members draw on irony to rhetorically head opponents off at the pass, performing their own 
version of the other side.  The question is: why would activist groups want to use such a 
convoluted mode of discourse?  The answer is at least partially found in the co-participatory 
workings of irony that Linda Hutcheon lays out.  As she explains, the presence of irony requires 
not only the intention of the ironist but also the intention of the receiver to read it as such.  For 
irony to happen, ironist and interpreter must share assumptions.  While many argue that irony 
creates in-groups (separating out those who “get it”), Hutcheon turns the formulation around to 
Amber Day  12 
argue that irony happens because discursive communities already exist, providing the context for 
irony.   
 It is my contention that the activist groups profiled here rely on existing discursive 
communities to understand their irony, but that they also attempt to turn these discursive 
communities into politicized communities, (or counterpublics).  Appealing to shared assumptions 
about the world, they challenge their audience to not only get the joke but to take up the issues as 
their own.   
 Of course, ironic forms of play are not the only type of activism operating today, nor the 
only type necessary to effect social change.  However, they have taken on a significant role 
within twenty-first century activism.  In the book, I trace the history of spectacular, playful, and 
ironic protest, moving from American suffragists, through 1960s groups like the Situationists and 
the Yippies, to ACT UP, and the culture-jamming movement.  I concentrate most heavily, 
however, on three contemporary groups: The Billionaires for Bush, The Yes Men, and Reverend 
Billy.  Each takes on the identities of their political opponents, using the “identity nab” to 
reframe their enemies and engage and entertain potential allies.   
 The Billionaires for Bush provide a great example of the identity nab.  Originally titled 
“Billionaires for Bush (or Gore),” the group developed in the lead-up to the U.S. election of 2000 
to draw attention to the influence of big money on politics.  When Bush won the presidency, the 
Billionaires focused on the policies of his administration they believed favored the wealthy.  
Their formula was simple: members dressed up in tuxedos and top hats, fake furs and evening 
gowns, and assumed ironic fake names like Meg A. Bucks or Ava Rice.  At events, they brought 
signs with slogans like “Leave No Billionaire Behind” and “Tax Work Not Wealth.”  The 
strategy was to link images of corporate greed and vast wealth disparities with particular 
politicians, and to reframe the terms of discussion.  If campaign financing or budget deficits were 
not primary topics of reportage, the Billionaires tried to reinsert them through coverage of their 
events.  Andrew Boyd, one of the founders, explains that the group aimed to design a 
“humorous, ironic media campaign that would spread like a virus via grassroots activists and the 
mainstream media” (369).  Anyone wishing to set up their own Billionaires chapter was 
encouraged to do so; the website provided suggestions for slogans, costuming, and talking 
points.  The concept has proven remarkably resilient, and has since been adapted to attack other 
targets, like the Billionaires for Tar Sands (protesting oil processing in the Canadian tar sands), 
and Billionaires for Wealthcare (supporting the Obama administration’s health care proposal in 
2009).  The concept creates a more interesting angle for reporters than simply relaying the 
number of protesters at an event, and, as Boyd explains, because humor and content were 
intertwined, “if the media wanted the humor (and they did), they had to take the content too” 
(373).   
 The ironic technique sets up a unique relationship between activists and audiences, so 
that, for bystanders to find the joke amusing, they must participate in the meaning-making 
process, sharing the group’s assumptions.  They have not likely succeeded in winning over many 
Republicans, nor should they necessarily.  Rather, they attempt to push otherwise peripheral 
issues into the public sphere and to politicize those who may already share their assumptions.  
The political point is clearly targeted, while the humor provides a satisfying wink to the 
audience.   
 This idea gets more complicated when the identity-nab is so convincing that the audience 
becomes entirely taken in.  The Yes Men, for instance, deliberately court confusion, attempting 
to “pass” in their assumed identities.  The group began with a parody website which closely 
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mirrored that of the World Trade Organization, but included damning statistics and critiques.  To 
their surprise, they were contacted by institutions that believed they were the real WTO.  They 
accepted the speaking invitations and began making presentations they thought more honestly 
represented the organization, trying to rankle their audiences with patently offensive ideas, like a 
flashy “management leisure suit” fitted with an inflatable television screen phallus designed to 
monitor workers.  They argue they are merely taking their adversaries’ positions to their logical 
extreme, pushing the neo-liberal market philosophy of the WTO only slightly further than the 
organization itself.  No one questions their ridiculous presentations because they have 
reproduced a simulacra of officialdom: a clean business suit, an air of gravitas, and a practiced 
power-point presentation.  While Baudrillard characterizes the rise of simulacra as profoundly 
anti-political, working to conceal and naturalize the lack of a real, the Yes Men create simulacra 
in the pursuit of distinctly political aims, precisely to reveal that lack, hoping to make people 
question the rhetoric used by real officials with real power.   
Most famously, they seized on an opportunity to represent Dow Chemical on the BBC, 
announcing that, after 20 years of denials, the company was taking responsibility for the plant 
explosion in Bhopal, India, compensating victims and cleaning up the site.  The stunt attracted a 
flurry of media reports, bringing the almost forgotten issue under scrutiny.  The group creatively 
attempts to influence the direction of public discourse, even if that involves a level of fraud.  The 
revealed hoaxes speak to a growing number of fans who take delight in witnessing the public 
pranking of organizations they are critical of, again providing affirmation for existing discursive 
communities.    
  It is this goal of fostering discussion and engagement to which the identity-nabbing tactic 
is aimed.  However, the technique need not be used exclusively to lampoon the opposition.  The 
performance artist/activist known as Reverend Billy has a more complex relationship to his 
character, borrowing some of the preacher figure’s genuine allure while still assuming an ironic 
distance.  Actor Bill Talen created the bouffant-hairdo-ed, booming-voiced preacher who now 
presides over the Church of Life after Shopping and its gospel choir.  The group organizes street 
performances and incursions into major chain stores, produces theatrical performances, hosts 
video-sermons, and is the subject of a documentary called What Would Jesus Buy? (2007).   
Talen uses the ironic, semi-comedic character to engage his audience, making it somehow more 
permissible for him to rant and rave in public.  Reverend Billy allows Talen to take his 
convictions to almost grotesque extremes, both amusing and inspiring those around him.   
 The performative power of Reverend Billy makes what Talen has to say compelling, 
allowing him to be both playful and serious at the same time.  Though it could appear that he is 
simply mocking religiosity, this is not the case.  All who have profiled Reverend Billy remark on 
the passion he summons forth in his flock.  A parodic send-up of a preacher on, say, Saturday 
Night Live would never attract the dedicated followers Talen has.  He preaches with genuine 
conviction, co-opting the power that the preacher figure exerts, allowing audiences to get caught 
up in his fervor, but still maintaining an ironic gap.  The irony is not about ridicule; rather, it is a 
more complicated form of play, one that is dependent on a discursive community willing to 
create the ironic reality together.  Reverend Billy’s church offers followers the chance to pick 
and choose elements of religion that they like (qualities like community, spirituality, and a higher 
truth), while remaining distrustful of organized religion.  This irreverent reverence is then 
funneled into political actions, drawing on the energy of do-it-yourself activism, providing the 
inspiration of a like-minded community. 
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  It is worth noting that irony as a mode of political discourse is not appreciated by 
everyone.  Typically, it polarizes the audience, potentially frustrating those who do not 
appreciate the joke.  Those unwilling to read the irony often dismiss these groups as nonsensical 
or see them as actively offensive.  However, irony does not itself create divisions; rather, it plays 
on existing differences of temperament and belief in the attempt to bring those beliefs to the 
surface.  It seems clear that activist groups draw on irony at least partially to bring observers’ 
attention to their shared understandings, spurring them into viewing themselves as a community 
with collective power.  Rather than seeing this as “preaching to the converted,” we might think 
of it as reconverting the converted.  Where ironic activism excels is in engaging an audience, 
attracting attention, and rallying support, all of which are integral in building political 
momentum.   
 
Conclusion 
 Though they are distinct genres, parodic news, satiric documentaries, and ironic activism 
are manifestations of similar impulses.  They share a desire to circumvent the standard conduits 
of political information.  While the parodic news shows critique the substance and tenor of the 
debate in mainstream news, a group like The Yes Men mimics the performance of power in 
order to draw critical attention to its core.  All attempt to reframe the terms of discussion or 
temporarily hijack it out of the hands of authority.  And all share a pointedly comedic mode, 
highlighting contradictions, inconsistencies, and absurdities, and mining them for their humor.  
Finally, all have succeeded to differing degrees in becoming pop culture phenomena, functioning 
as cultural reference points.     
The remaining question is whether the critique can move from simple opposition to a 
more fleshed-out platform for concrete change.  One of the most damning criticisms leveled at 
the ironic/parodic/satiric mode is that it is always locked in a negative bind, criticizing but not 
helping to produce a positive vision.  This would seem to be a serious limitation, particularly for 
explicitly political material.  However, as I have argued, the highly politicized forms of satire 
chronicled here frequently gesture beyond the problematic present, often providing concrete 
suggestions for alternatives.  As a further example, some of the activist groups are also 
experimenting with ways of moving beyond critique alone.  Most spectacularly, in November of 
2008, days after the presidential election, a number of diverse activist groups including the Yes 
Men, United for Peace and Justice, Code Pink, The Anti-Advertising Agency, Improv 
Everywhere, and others, came together in a massive collaboration, managing to print and 
distribute tens of thousands of copies of a fake edition of The New York Times.  Rather than 
critique a particular topical story, the activists created a vision of the world they hoped to see in 
the not too distant future.   
The paper was a spot-on reproduction of the Times, but the date of publication was listed 
as July 4, 2009, roughly eight months in the future, while the content was aspirational.  The top 
headline blared “Iraq War Ends.”  Other stories included Congress passing a “maximum wage 
law” and the impending development of national health care.  Everything in the paper painted an 
image of what the country could look like given a progressive tilt in priorities.   
In addition to the logistical triumphs in distributing thousands of copies, it also 
represented a significant shift in focus for many of the groups involved.  After loudly protesting 
the policies of the Bush administration for eight years, this action was focused on creating a 
vision for what the upcoming Obama era should look like.  One contributor explained, “it’s 
about what’s possible, if we think big and act collectively (“New York”).  This stunt is 
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particularly notable for its attempt to draw on the power of counterpublics, not just to get 
everyone angry about the present, but to spur them to work toward alternatives.  I close the book 
with some discussion of this event because it is a good example of ironic critique that manages to 
move beyond criticism toward articulating a future vision.  Again, we have an instance of irony 
used in the service of entirely earnest and, in this case, concrete ends.   
Regardless of technique, all of these examples of irony, satire, and parody are intended to 
intrude into the public conversation.  Rather than engendering cynicism, as critics charge, they 
are a calculated shot across the bow of the cynically manufactured elements of public debate.  
The fact that they are sparking so much interest and enthusiasm seems particularly significant, 
especially when seen against the background of reported political apathy and disinterest.  In an 
era when political discourse is so often over-produced, stage-managed, and predictably 
choreographed, these examples of performative satire offer a way of satisfyingly breaking 
through the existing script.   
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